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Coping with Foreign-Law Impediments
to the Export Licensing of
United States Technology
I. Think Things, Not Words
Any lawyer who wishes to deal effectively with the transnational ap-
plication of industrial innovation must bear constantly in mind a wise
admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes: Think things, not words.' Of that
lawyer's intellectual tasks none is more difficult than discerning the actual,
honest-to-goodness things that are obscured by the deceptive words of
that lulling, meretricious phrase, "the transfer of technology."
That insidious phrase suggests that "technology" is some sort of chro-
mosome consomme that can be drawn from the veins of one society and
injected into the arteries of another, where it will faithfully replicate the
skills of the transferor in the activities of the transferee. Worse: by using
the one-way verb "transfer," the phrase hints that transfusing the magic
consommd, like giving alms, requires only action by the transferor and
entails no corresponding effort on the part of the transferee.
That suggestion and hint are false; worse than false, they are inimical
to a mutually beneficial relationship between the two aggregations of
mankind most concerned with the so-called "transfer of technology." One
aggregation is the "North" (meaning: Western Europe, the United States
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1. "We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words
into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true." 0. W. HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 238 (1899).
"How few people think accurately-and think things not words." I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS
738 (1925).
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and Japan, give or take Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which has
been able, thus far, to harness the Promethean forces that were born of
the Western Renaissance and matured in the Industrial Revolution. The
other aggregation is the "South -- nations that did not directly experience
the Western Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution and have not suc-
cessfully simulated the Western institutions those cultural cataclysms
produced.
The conventional economic wisdom tells the South that it should envy
the high material mass-consumption of the North and, to achieve it,
should buy, borrow, beg or steal a good stiff injection of the magic
chromosome consomme, Northern technology. I suspect that the con-
ventional wisdom is wrong. My hunch is that, when the verdict of history
is in, even if the jury decides that the North's high material mass-
consumption was sustainable and worthy of envy, the verdict will con-
clude that the South never could have reached economic parity with
the North merely by injections of Northern technology; that to rival the
North the South needed to develop the cultural attitudes-scientific
curiosity, entrepreneurism, and popular government-from which the
Northern technology sprang; in short, that the South needed to ignite
a Renaissance and endure an Industrial Revolution of its own. If that
is correct, the resources of the South would now be better applied to
reading the Great Books, and to developing a few homegrown Jeffer-
sons, Edisons and Henry Fords, than to financing quick fixes of magic
Northern consomm6.
Of course my hunch may be incorrect. The answer, in any case,
will never be reduced to verdict; it is the nature of history that the
jury is always out. Therefore, in considering foreign-law impediments
to the export of U.S. technology, instead of passing a patronizing
Northern judgment on the South with future hindsight it will be more
constructive to take the present South at its present words-the fa-
miliar words that the South needs "the transfer of technology" from
the North-but to think carefully about the things those words really
represent.
11. But First, Three Ghusls
Before a believer enters the mosque for Friday prayer he performs a
ghusl; that is, he washes himself. Whether a ghusl works by cleansing
his soul or merely by getting the sand out of his eyes, I leave to the
believer; but either way it helps.
When it comes to understanding transnational enterprise we Americans
have a lot of sand in our eyes. Before we enter the mosque of technology-
transfer-analysis we would benefit from three ghusls.
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A. AMERICA THE SLOTHFUL
The first ghusl is to wash away the misperception that the United States
is a paragon of productivity. The facts, alas, are otherwise.
Between 1950 and 1985 America's share of world exports plummeted
from 21 percent to 12.6 percent. 2 Our export trade balance deteriorated
consistently over the last half-decade, reaching in 1985 a record annual
deficit of $124.3 billion. 3 As a component of that deficit our trade balance
in high technology goods has remained positive but is shrinking rapidly;
it peaked at $23.6 billion in 1981 but declined each year since, to an
estimated $5 billion or less in 1984. 4
Our lagging competitiveness in trade correlates directly with our poor
record in research, productivity and savings. We invest less in civilian
research and development than does any of our major industrial com-
petitors; our nonmilitary R&D expenditures now run about 1.5 percent
of GNP compared to 2 percent for them. 5 In manufacturing productivity
the United States since 1977 has grown at a slower rate than Japan, France
or West Germany, and by 1983 ended up a poor third to West Germany
and France among the industrial powers. 6 During 1983 the United States
had the lowest rate of personal savings among developed nations: only 5
percent of GNP compared to 23 percent in Italy, 21 percent in Japan, 14
percent in West Germany and 13 percent in Canada. 7 Not surprisingly, in
1984 our gross fixed investment amounted to only 16 percent of GNP,
compared to 28 percent for the Japanese and 20 percent for West Ger-
mans.
8
2. Bus. AM. May 2, 1983, at 9; ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1985, at 75 (second quarter 1985
figures).
3. On a C.I.F. basis, $148.5 billion. ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1985, at 75; N.Y. Times, Mar.
12, 1986, at 30.
4. U.S. HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, 1985) v.
On a scale that measures "international expansion in technology" by a combination of
trade, overseas investment and export licensing in high technology products, during 1974-
1983 the United States' rate of expansion was lower than those of Japan, West Germany,
France and the U.K., and actually declined. HEIN, THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 1980's
(The Conference Board, 1985) 20.
The ably-presented study, AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITIVENESS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES (U.S. Department of Commerce, February 1983), came to a similar conclusion:
"Over the last twelve years, there has been a decline in the international market position
of U.S. high technology industries from a position of dominance to one of being strongly
challenged." Id. at iii.
Nevertheless, in 1983 the United States registered a $4.2 billion net favorable balance of
payments in the licensing and assignment of patents, trademarks and copyrights. Bus. AM.,
Mar. 19, 1985, at 3.
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Those statistics do not profile a world leader in industrial innovation.
Surveying them, a prominent U.S. economist recently concluded that
"The huge technological edge enjoyed by Americans in the 1950s and
1960s has disappeared. Whereas America once had effortless economic
superiority, it is now faced with competitors who have matched its eco-
nomic achievements and may be in the process of moving ahead of it." 9
Within the United States the economic record of Texas has of late been
even less impressive. Consider, for example, the recent congressionally-
commissioned analysis by the S.M.U. Business School of the declining
export performance of the three industrial sectors considered basic to this
state: energy, high tech and agriculture. I° In oil field hardware-an in-
dustry that in 1982 was 54 percent dependent on export sales and in which
Texas has traditionally accounted for upwards of 75 percent of all U.S.
employment'I'-U.S. employment dropped from nearly 100,000 in 1982
to slightly more than 60,000 in 198412 and the percentage of the U.S.
market occupied by imported tubular goods rose from 9.2 percent in 1975
to 70 percent in 1985.13 Between 1980 and 1984, 106 American refineries
closed, twenty-three of them in Texas. 14 Nearly 13,000 Dallas-area semi-
conductor workers were laid off during the first nine months of 1985.15
Between 1981 and 1983 the real value of Texas agricultural exports fell
by more than 48 percent in cotton, 31 percent in wheat, and 21 percent
in rice. 16 The S.M.U. study concludes that, because Texas is disadvan-
tageously vulnerable to foreign markets, "the competitive pressures on
a wide range of Texas industries . . . are sure to intensify in the years
ahead." 17
It is a chastening picture. If we Americans persist in our improvidence
the United States will become a net importer of new technology, not its
innovative source.
B. THE INFRA-GREEN MACHINE
The second ghusl that we should perform before entering the mosque
of technology-transfer-analysis is to wash from our eyes the false image
9. Id. at 21 (Lester Thurow).
10. Weinstein & Gross, The Vulnerability of the Texas Economy to World Trade Patterns
(Center for Enterprising, Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University,
Oct. 1985).
11. Id. at 1i, Fig. 2.
12. Id. Fig. 1.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 39.
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of the United States as the world's most ardent champion of free trade.
For this ghusl water is not enough. We also need a global perspective in
which to wash.
Suppose we ship out on a space shuttle and while orbiting the earth
check out the latest gadget on board. It has a small videoscreen and a
large barrel aimed earthwards, brightly painted in the inspiring colors of
new one-thousand-dollar bills. This is the famous Infra-Green Machine.
I.t senses all elements of transnational commerce: not merely tangible
elements such as goods and people, or quantifiable elements such as value,
credit, debt, investment and liability, but-infinitely more important-
elements that are both intangible and unquantifiable, such as technology,
ideas and cultural attitudes, which dominate all the other elements but
unfortunately are invisible to economists and the naked eye.
When you press Button "F" the videoscreen of the Infra-Green Ma-
chine lights up with arrowed vectors that show exactly how much freedom
each element of transnational commerce has to enter each nation on earth.
It is amazing. Looking down the barrel at the world, we see not oceans
and continents but intersecting polarities of cultural variation, revealing
that every nation is a born-again free trader in some elements of trans-
national commerce but a die-hard protectionist in all the rest.
The two great polarity-radiuses that we discover are the North and the
South. Their vectors tell us that the North freely accepts ideas, credit,
technology, most investment and some manufactured goods, but resists
agricultural commodities, automobiles, textiles and people. By contrast,
the South accepts ideas and some people, but carefully screens all goods
and rejects most investment. For imports of credit and technology the
South's freedom vectors are rather faint. That tells us that, having already
received too much credit, the South would now like to receive more but
is nervous of the terms, and that although the South craves technology
it is leery of any technology that is linked to foreign investment, high
royalties or tough contracts.
Fascinated by the Infra-Green Machine, we now calibrate it to a smaller
focus and discover a myriad of subradiuses spider-webbing the larger two.
We preceive that, within the North, Japan is rather isolated-hermetically
sealed as to people and more mysteriously barriered against goods and
investment; that Western Europe is rather middling on all scores; and that
the free-trade vectors of the United States are warped by some unusual
ideological hang-ups (as evidenced by our antitrust laws, product liability
laws, antiboycott regulations, and the embargoing of political enemies like
Iran and Libya) that are largely incomprehensible to the rest of mankind.
Then we notice that Islam, a subset of the South, accepts many goods
(though less investment) but rejects alcohol, pornography and other cul-
turally destabilizing exports from the North. Another Southern subset,
FALL 1986
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the Marxist states, enthusiastically accept technology (to the point of
burglary!) but firmly shut the door on investment, ideas and people, and
massively screen all else.
After several enthralled hours at the videoscreen of the Infra-Green
Machine, we come to realize three things: First, transnational commerce
is a many- and subtly-splendored thing, composed of a multitude of quite
diverse elements, the most valuable of which are intangible and unquan-
tifiable. Second, no nation freely accepts all of the elements. Third, if
virtue consists of accepting absolute freedom of transnational commerce,
every nation, in the eyes of others, sins.
C. TECHNOLOGY AND ENTERPRISE
The third ghusl we need to perform is less a washing of our eyes than
a scrubbing of our vocabulary. We need to scour the glamour off that
misleading word "technology" and see it for what it is.
The beginning of discernment is to realize that technology is only a
part of enterprise, and that an enterprise is much greater than the sum
of its parts. The success of an industrial technique is realized not in its
conception but in its practical application-normally, through manufac-
ture and distribution. In an Adam Smith world the best way to "transfer
technology" would be to move the entire enterprise that applies it.
Transnationally such a transfer would require absolute freedom of move-
ment, across political boundaries, of market, raw materials, corporate
structure, labor, management, finance, ownership, administration, dis-
tribution, and (only rather incidentally) the technology itself. In the real
world such freedom of movement is, of course, a political impossibility.
Even within the United States, which through political federalism
achieved the world's largest economy, the chauvinistic jockeying of
states subtly distorts a theoretically untrammeled domestic market. The
European Economic Community has even more stubborn internal ob-
stacles to overcome. Outside the internal markets of the United States
and the EEC, barriers to the transnational movement of enterprise make
a quantum jump.
When a business crosses national borders today, it finds that it must
leave behind many of the elements that made it a success at home. Its
market and sources of raw materials necessarily change. Whether by
operation of law or choice, its corporate organization almost inevitably
follows suit. It is hardly less certain that its labor and management will
be similarly restricted. Either by direct regulation or as a result of tax
differentials its sources of finance will be affected. The same may be
true of its ownership, especially in nations that require minimum per-
centages of locally held equity. While techniques of administration and
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distribution may not encounter explicit regulation, they must, as a prac-
tical matter, conform to local differences in labor, management and
market. Of all the elements of the enterprise it is, in fact, technology
that remains relatively unscathed. It is as though the receiving nation
were saying, "What we really want is your technology. You can't bring
in the rest of your business unless you change everything else to suit
us."
Now, obviously, all those direct restrictions on the transnational move-
ment of an enterprise constitute indirect restrictions on the transnational
movement of the technology that enterprise would apply. In the imposition
of really onerous restrictions (minimum percentages of local equity own-
ership, for example) the technology-hungry nations of the South are in-
finitely greater offenders than the technology-productive nations of the
North. Hence the paradox that the nations that most vigorously demand
access to foreign technology are the very nations which, by restricting




When enterprises are frustrated by foreign law from moving bodily
across national frontiers, they achieve economic impact abroad in three
principal ways: exporting goods, exporting services and exporting knowl-
edge. It is the last-the export of knowledge-that concerns us as, with
perceptions sharpened by our three ghusls, we now examine foreign-law
impediments to the export of U.S. technology.
It is a chaos: some 160 separate nations plus a dozen supranational
affinity groups, each with its own intricate web of legislation; behind each
web a baffling maze of connivance and politics; the global whole capil-
laried by the tunneling meanders of thousands of bilateral and multilateral
treaties. To learn the technology-impediments of any nation is the labor
of years; describing them all is an encyclopedia. Therefore we will not
look for trees, but forests, in search of general techniques that will help
us to cut timber anywhere.
We will consider three impediment-forests in particular, because they
typify nations at three distinct stages of what the economists call "de-
velopment." They are Western Europe, the world's first industrialized
region; Japan, fully industrialized since World War II; and Latin America,
which lusts after industrialization but has not achieved it. Let us examine
the impediments of each of those forests from the viewpoint of a U.S.
exporter of technology.
FALL 1986
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B. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Although the Treaty of Rome 18 does not supplant the national industrial
property laws of its member states, regulating the licensing of technology
to the twelve nations that constitute the European Economic Community
is principally a function of Article 85 of the Treaty. The first paragraph
of that article prohibits restrictive arrangements that diminish trade be-
tween member states. The second paragraph declares that agreements for
such arrangements are void. The third paragraph allows exemptions to
be granted.
Under that third paragraph the EEC Council issued Regulation 17 of
1962,19 which required notice of offending agreements but granted a tem-
porary amnesty to those notified by November 1, 1962. The resulting
inundation led to the famous "Christmas message" of December 24, 1962,20
in which the Commission listed standard clauses in patent licenses that
were not considered to violate Article 85 and therefore did not need to
be notified. Those exemptions were redefined in the Patent License Group
Exemption, which the Commission issued effective January 1, 1985.21
Reflecting the basic policy of the Treaty, the regulatory focus of the Group
Exemption is not on commerce within a member state of the Community
or on commerce between a member state and the outside world, but only
on commerce among member states themselves.
The licensing of technology from U.S. licensors to licensees in the EEC
is facilitated by income tax treaties. The United States has such a treaty
in effect with each of the twelve member states. Besides establishing
reciprocal source-rules those treaties substantially reduce-in most cases,
to zero-the tax on royalties and technical service fees paid to U.S.
licensors. 22
C. JAPAN
During the four postwar decades of Japan's development as a world
industrial power, its regulation of inbound technology licenses has me-
tamorphosed from a system of rigorous prior approval to one of permissive
supervision. The change paralleled the maturing of the yen. In 1950, when
the yen was a fledgling currency, Japan adopted the Foreign Investment
18. COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH), Sec. 151.
19. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Feb. 21, 1962, at 62; COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH), Sec. 2401.
20. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Dec. 24, 1962, at 2922; COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH), Sec. 2698.
21. Commission Regulation 2349/84, published in OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, Aug. 16, 1984, at 15; COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH), Sec. 2747.
22. See Table 1. The Spanish-U.S. treaty covers only certain types of income.
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Law, which authorized the government to require prior approval of all
technology licenses. As the yen became more self-sufficient, approvals
became more readily available. In 1980 the Foreign Investment Law was
replaced by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, 23
under which proposed technology licenses must merely be reported to
the Bank of Japan and are considered approved if not vetoed within a
waiting period. 24
Licensing to Japan is also regulated by the Japanese antitrust law25 ,
which dates from the U.S. military occupation and addresses trade dis-
tortions with Yankee rectitude. It is enforced by the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission, which has issued guidelines governing transnational con-
tracts for the supply of technology to Japan. 26 The Japanese party to such
a contract is required to file a copy with the Commission within thirty
days after it is signed. 27
The income tax treaty between the United States and Japan facilitates
U.S. technology licensing by limiting to 10 percent the rate of Japanese
tax on royalties and technical service fees paid to U.S. licensors. 28 This
approximates Japan, as a recipient of technology from the United States,
to the tax-favored status of the EEC.
D. LATIN AMERICA
Legislation regulating inbound licensing has reached its "fullest
development" 29 in Latin America, whose technology laws can be under-
stood better as a series of historically related events than as separate
national enactments or a logical whole.
1. Brazil
Brazil, a nation of endemic inflation and chronic currency control, was
an influential innovator. By an income tax regulation of 195830 Brazil
limited the amount of royalties that would be accepted as deductible. In
1962 there followed the Law on Foreign Investments, 3 1 which prohibited
the payment of royalties above specified percentages (zero, for patents
or trademark royalties to the payor's corporate parent) and required cer-
23. Law No. 65 of 1979.
24. Id. at art. 29(2).
25. Law No. 54 of 1947.
26. Guidelines for International Contracts Introducing Technology, May 24, 1968.
27. Id. at art. 6(2).
28. See Table I.
29. Richards, Licensing in the International Field, in DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TECH-
NOLOGY LICENSING 1984 (hereinafter cited as Richards), p. 233.
30. Tax Reg. 436.
31. Law 4131.
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tain agreements to be registered with the Central Bank. Present legislation 32
includes a long list of forbidden clauses and provides that before any
patent, trademark, know-how, or technical service agreement is signed it
must be submitted in draft to the powerful National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI), whose approval is prerequisite to the effectiveness of
the agreement vis-A-vis third parties or as the basis for the remittance or
deductibility of royalties.
2. ANCOM
The Andean Common Market (ANCOM) dates from the 1969 Agree-
ment of Cartagena 33 among Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru.
Venezuela joined in 1974. Chile left, for most purposes, in 1976.
ANCOM's principal objectives were duty-free internal commerce and
a common external tariff, but the Agreement of Cartagena also pledged
"a common system for the treatment of foreign capital and, likewise,
systems for trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties." 34 The result was
Decision 24,35 the 1971 guidelines for the entry of foreign investment,
loans, supplies and technology. It made inbound licenses subject to gov-
ernment approval, to be conditioned upon the presence of mandatory
clauses and the absence of prohibited ones. 36 Local subsidiaries were
forbidden to pay or deduct royalties to foreign parents or to credit tech-
nology transfers as contributions to capital. 37
There are significant national variations in the implementation of those
guidelines by legislation of the ANCOM member states, 38 but Decision
24 remains an influential prototype of regulation in Latin America and
throughout the technology-importing world.
The absence of income tax treaties constitutes a further impediment to
technology licensing from the United States to ANCOM member states.
32. Principally, Law 5648 of Dec. II, 1970, Law 5772 of Dec. 21, 1971, Normative Act
No. 15 of Sept. 1I, 1975, Normative Act No. 32 of May 5, 1978, Normative Act No. 60 of
Mar. 24. 1982, and Normative Act No. 64 of Sept. 16, 1983. These are discussed in Richards,
234-239. See also J. PINHEIRO NETO, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL, Ch. 19; and Nattier,
Limitations on Marketing Foreign Technology in Brazil, II INT'L LAW 437 (1977).
33. Reproduced in translation at 8 I.L.M. 910 (1960). The formation of ANCOM is de-
scribed in Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization and the New International Economic Order:
Tie Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 Tex. INT'L L.J. 289 (1978), at 290-292. Latin American
licensing precedents antecedent to ANCOM are described in Lacey, Technology Licensing
and Industrial Property Licensing: A Legislative Revolution, 6 INT'L LAW. 388 (1972).
34. Art. 27.
35. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Li-
censes and Royalties, reproduced in translation at 10 I.L.M. 152 (1971). A composite text
including amendments through 1976 is reproduced in translation at 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977).
36. Arts. 18-20.
37. Art. 21.
38. National enactments through 1977 are tabulated in Murphy, The Andean Common
Market and Mexico: A Foreign Investment Profile, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307.(1978).
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Their current tax rates on royalties and technical service fees paid to U.S.
licensors are disadvantageously higher than those of the EEC countries
and Japan. 39
3. Mexico
Of all Latin American nations, Mexico imposes the most formidable
barrier to the export of U.S. technology. That barrier is composed of three
correlated enactments of the administration of President Luis Echeverrfa:
the Foreign Investment Law, 40 the Technology Law,4 1 and the Inventions
and Trademarks Law.42
Of that forbidding Echeverrfan Wall, 43 the Foreign Investment Law
divides all business activities into four categories. The first is reserved
exclusively to the state, the second to Mexicans, and in the third foreign
ownership is limited to less than 49 percent. In the fourth category per-
centages of foreign-owned equity are administratively negotiable but with
rare exceptions 49 percent has been the rule. The result is to relegate
most new foreign investment in Mexico to the rather uninviting role of
minority participant in a joint venture dominated by a Mexican majority.
The Technology Law makes registration requisite to the validity of
virtually every written instrument that seeks effect in Mexico and trans-
fers, licenses or supplies patents, trademarks, know-how, or the like. The
Technology Registry may refuse such registration for seventeen reasons.
The most troublesome of those reasons invalidates a license for a term
of more than ten years, a license that continues confidentiality obligations
after its term, and a license that involves royalties the Registry deems
too high. The royalty rates permitted in practice have been, by interna-
tional commercial standards, rather low. The Technology Law has thus
tended to discourage the licensing of top-quality technology to Mexico.
The third revetment of the Echeverrfan Wall, the Inventions and Trade-
marks Law, has impeded foreign licensing in high technology fields by
reducing the availability, scope and duration of Mexican patents. Inven-
tions in ten broad categories are unpatentable. These include chemical
products, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, food and
39. See Table I.
40. Ley para Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, 317
D.O. 5, Mar. 9, 1973.
41. Originally enacted as Ley sobre el Registro de [a Transferencia de Tecnologfa y el
Uso y Explotaci6n de Patentes y Marcas, 315 D.O. 45, Dec. 30, 1972; reenacted with
amendments as Ley sobre el Control y Registro de ]a Transferencia de Tecnologfa y el Uso
y Explotaci6n de Patentes y Marcas, 370 D.O. 15, Jan. I1, 1981.
42. Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, 334 D.O. 7, Feb. 10, 1976.
43. The three Echeverrian enactments are analyzed in detail in Murphy, The Echeverrian
Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign Investment and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J.
135 (1982).
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drink. Patents when obtainable are good for ten years only, nonrenewable,
and even during that short term are subject to compulsory licensing and
lapsing for failure of exploitation. An even more discouraging provision
of the Inventions and Trademarks Law is trademark linking, the require-
ment that on goods manufactured in Mexico a trademark originally reg-
istered abroad may not be used alone, but must be joined "in an equally
visible manner" with a trademark originally registered in Mexico. That
rule, laying in effect a predicate for the expropriation of the Mexican
value of the foreign mark, proved so unworkable that its date of effec-
tiveness has been postponed annually ever since the Inventions and Trade-
marks Law was passed.
Technology licensing from the United States to Mexico is further dis-
advantaged by the absence of an income tax treaty between the two
nations. That leaves unrestricted the high Mexican tax rates on royalties
paid to U.S. licensors. 44
4. Countercurrents
There are two countercurrent nations whose receptivity to foreign tech-
nology may be a more accurate indicator of future Latin American atti-
tudes than the relative xenophobia of Mexico, Brazil and the ANCOM
states.
One is Chile. Having resigned from Decision 24, it now requires inbound
licenses to be registered only for purposes of Central Bank remittance
approvals. 45
The other countercurrent nation is Argentina, which introduced a
technology-restrictive law in 197146 and reinforced it in 1974, 47 but re-
versed the trend in 197648 and in 198149 enacted legislation that eliminated
prior approvals, forbidden clauses and royalty ceilings on technology
licenses from unrelated licensors.
IV. Magnatrends
When we undertake to research and draft a particular outbound license
our main foreign-law concern is, of course, the legislation currently on
the books of the technology importing nation, but we should not ignore
44. See Table I.
45. Law 19231 of 1971.
46. Decree Law 1748 of 1977, superseding Decree Law 600 of 1974.
47. Law 20794 of 1974.
48. Law 21617 of 1976.
49. Law 22426 of 1981. This legislation is discussed in L. ECKSTROM, LICENSING IN
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS, Ch. 30; and Otamendi, Major Changes in Argentina,
reproduced at 2 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING, 2E-413.
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trends in international politics that may be even more influential, in the
long run, to the success or failure of the project.
One such trend was the series of resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly that proclaimed a "New International Economic Or-
der." The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order, 50 adopted in 1974 without roll call vote, admonished the
developed nations to provide "[p]referential and non-reciprocal treat-
ment," including "the transfer of technology," to the undeveloped world. 51
Its companion "Programme of Action" declared that "All efforts should
be made .. . [t]o adapt commercial practices concerning the transfer of
technology to the requirements of the developing countries." 52 The Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 53 which passed the Assembly
in 1975 over the dissenting votes of only the United States and five of its
North European allies, asserted that "[e]very State has a right to benefit
from the advances and developments of science and technology" 54 and
"[a]ll States should facilitate the access of developing countries to ...
the transfer of technology ... in forms and in accordance with procedures
which are suited to their economies and their needs." '55
Reducing that soaring rhetoric to an "international code of conduct for
the transfer of technology" was a goal of both the 1974 Programme of
Action 56 and the 1975 Charter,57 a task the General Assembly entrusted
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). 58 So far UNCTAD has failed to achieve a code consensus
among the principal contending factions-the so-called Group of 77 (rep-
resenting the undeveloped world), Group B (the developed nations) and
Group D (the Marxist states of Eastern Europe). 59 The last failure oc-
curred at the 1985 UNCTAD Conference in Geneva. 60
50. Reproduced at 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
51. Id. at arts. 4(n), 4(p).
52. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
Art. IV(d). 13 I.L.M. 720 (1974).





58. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/188 of Dec. 19, 1977.
59. Competing draft outlines of such a code are reproduced at 14 I.L.M. 1329 (1975)
(Group B), 14 I.L.M. 1333 (1975) (Group 77), and 14 I.L.M. 1344 (1975) (Group D). A
"tentative composite draft" is reproduced at 17 I.L.M. 453 (1978); for competing draft texts
see 17 I.L.M. 462 (1978) (Group of 77), 17 I.L.M. 473 (Group B), and 17 I.L.M. 481 (Group
D). At 19 I.L.M. 773 (1980) is reproduced a "draft code" prepared by the UNCTAD
secretariat that is bracketed to show competing language offered by the various groups.
For a discussion of recent code negotiations, see Roffe, Transfer of Technology: UNCTAD's
Draft International Code of Conduct, 19 INT'L LAW, 689 (1985).
60. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 795 (1985).
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Meanwhile the United States is leading two counteroffensives for tech-
nology exporters in preparation for the round of General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in Geneva next September. One
is to achieve GATT agreement on a reduction of national barriers to
transnational services, which often involve high technology exports in
which developed nations excel. 6 1 The other is for a Counterfeiting Code
to outlaw the pirating of goods patented, trademarked or copyrighted in
the developed world. 62 Some of the most chronic counterfeiting occurs
in nations that are most restrictive of inbound technology licensing, be-
cause they tend to have the weakest industrial property laws.
V. Coping
How can an American lawyer most effectively cope with the formidable
impediments to the export of U.S. technology that are presented by for-
eign law? Experience suggests the following approach.
A. "TRANSNATIONAL LICENSING," PLEASE!
In thinking about and describing the task, the first rule is: try to avoid
that deceptive phrase, "the transfer of technology." It is at best misleading
and at worst an accomplice to the overweening Third World pretensions
of the "New International Economic Order."
Think and say "transnational licensing" instead. It is remarkable how
well that honest label scours the false glamour off the endeavor and slots
the participants into their proper roles.
B. WHY?
Transnational licenses are enormously diverse in purpose. It is essential
for the lawyer to know exactly what his client-at the highest levels of
management-hopes to accomplish with the particular license the lawyer
is asked to research and draft. Aftertax royalties? Market sharing? A
toehold for more extensive foreign enterprise? Pretax distributions from
an overseas subsidiary? Showcase cooperation with a foreign government,
deliberately unprofitable, to sell a bigger project? Or simply sorting out
global R&D costs among foreign affiliates of a single U.S. enterprise? 6 3
61. ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1985, at 67; Bus. AM., Nov. 25, 1985, at 14.
62. Bus. AM., Mar. 18, 1985, at 3; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1985, at 22 and Jan. 23, 1986,
at 23.
63. For discussions of the myriad purposes of transnational licenses, see Arnold, Basic
Considerations in Licensing, in DoMESTIC AND FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 1984,
35; and Taraglini, Foreign Licensing and Joint Venture Arrangements, in FOREIGN BUSINESS
PRACrICES (U.S. Department of Commerce 1985) 58. Cohen et al., NONTARIFI BARRIERS
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The ultimate why of the license is often not apparent to the lawyer from
the terms of his assignment. Determining that why may require consid-
erable persistence and tact on his part. But determine it he must, if the
license is to accomplish its intended purpose, and especially if the license
is to deal effectively with the foreign-law impediments that would oth-
erwise frustrate that purpose.
C. THE GOLD MINES
The third rule is to deal effectively with foreign counsel and sources of
foreign law, each of which is a gold mine of assistance that will be squan-
dered if not quarried thoughtfully and in the correct sequence.
Faced with the task of preparing an outbound technology license, the
inexperienced American lawyer grabs a telephone and asks foreign coun-
sel how to do it-or worse, asks foreign counsel to draft it in the first
place. The more experienced technique is first to check out the foreign
law problems generally, from secondary sources of foreign law available
in the United States, in order to sense the history and trend of applicable
foreign legislation and to visualize the intended license in the context of
the "forbidden clauses" the current law proscribes. That technique yields
the general contour of the problem and frequently suggests factual alter-
natives to "forbidden" terms.
Having done his homework, the experienced American lawyer then
consults foreign counsel, but first he chooses thoughtfully which foreign
counsel to consult. The world of transnational technology licensing is tiny.
North-to-South lawyer relationships, in particular, are a short funnel with
a wide entry and an extremely narrow spout. In a typical technology
importing nation only a few local law firms advise a large proportion of
all U.S. licensors. There are inevitable predispositions toward the status
quo. If Lic. Fulano has negotiated fifty licenses with the Technology
Registry for his good and continuing client, ABC Corporation, and settled
them all at a royalty of 5 percent, how fiercely will Lic. Fulano fight for
a royalty of 10 percent when he tackles the Technology Registry tomorrow
on behalf of his new single-license client, XYZ Corporation? The expe-
rienced American lawyer ponders that problem a while, and decides how
it should be handled, before he calls Lic. Fulano up.
Having established the relationship, the American lawyer initiates the
work by sending foreign counsel a draft license-preferably the entire
wish-list, amputated only as to the most intractable "forbidden" clauses.
Meanwhile foreign counsel sends, for his American colleague to study,
TO HIGH-TECHNOLOGY TRADE (1985) considers licensing strategies in the larger context of
high technology exports.
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the full text of the current law. It should be in the original language, if (as
is ideal) the American lawyer can read it. If the text is in translation,
foreign counsel should personally vouch for its accuracy. The full-text
law will probably reveal some startling variance from the secondary sources
the American lawyer consulted first.
American and foreign counsel are now both well-equipped to com-
municate effectively toward a well-drawn license.
D. TAXES
For a U.S. licensor, determining the economic consequences of a trans-
national license involves highly sophisticated knowledge, and deft mesh-
ing, of the foreign and U.S. taxes the royalties or other compensation will
attract. Frequently that necessitates the participation of additional tax
specialists on both the U.S. and foreign sides of the licensor's team. This
greatly increases the problems of team communications, which now may
have to span not only linguistic and national lines, but professional bound-
aries as well.
Project-negating cost determinations and much wasted drafting can re-
sult if the net tax assumptions of a license are not articulated and verified
up front. Particularly in the case of licensing to a nation that does not
have a tax treaty with the United States, secondary and translated infor-
mation concerning foreign taxes is frequently misleading, outdated or
incomplete. Similarly the utility of foreign tax credits to a particular li-
censor should not be left to assumption. In sum: research and professional
determination of the net U.S. and foreign tax consequences to the U.S.
licensor should be not the last, but one of the first, items on the checklist
of any outbound license.
E. LARGER TALENTS
From the standpoint of a U.S. client the most valuable professional
attribute of a good American international lawyer is his practiced intuition
of political and economic trends abroad. That attribute is no less useful
in outbound licensing than in other fields of transnational enterprise.
From the vantage point of his experience the international lawyer sees
particular national events and enactments as components of regional pat-
terns or historical trends that may be more reliable, as indicators of the
health and longevity of a given license, than the signed paper. Because
of his general and more objective perspective the American lawyer is
often better situated to predict events in a given foreign country than is
his foreign colleague, whose entire personal frame of reference is focused
there. (The same is true, in reverse, of the foreign counselor to a foreign
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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licensor to the United States. We are all prisoners of our propinquities.)
When contributing to an export of U.S. technology his specific skills in
research, communication and drafting, the licensor's American lawyer
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